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Wisdom teachings NYC 11 Lam Rim Chen mo

Part IV

Talk 24: 11-11-05

[Audience] We are around the bottom of page 130 in the English text. In the Tibetan it is near the end of page 583.

[Rimpoche] Basically, what we have covered is that the system presented earlier is not correct, because it destroys the Madhyamika’s distinguishing feature. We had to recognize what the distinguishing feature is, and how the other system tries to destroy it, and how the Madhyamika responds to that; the actual presentation of the distinguishing feature of the Madhyamika’s viewpoints, and how the materialists have been arguing against it. With the word “materialistic” we are making a bit of a big statement. Actually, the word really is u ma wa [sp.? is it u ma rang gyu pa?], which is not the materialistic that we normally think when we are thinking spiritualistic and materialistic. It is not that materialistic, but it is a more gross material level, how they argue.

First is the actual distinguishing feature of the Madhyamika. That is basically bringing in words from the Sixty Stanzas, which is actually the establishment of the causes and effects. We have a short verse here.

Through this virtue may all beings

Amass the collections of merit and wisdom

And attain the two sublime embodiments

That arise from merit and wisdom. p. 129

Says that the two types of virtues brings two types of result. In a shorter form, in shorter way, the ultimate goal that we practitioners hope to achieve is the two types of kayas: the rupakaya – or the physical aspects of the enlightenment – is brought by the method practice, which is love, compassion, etc.. And the mind part is brought by the wisdom merit. That is basically the number one point about the Madhyamaka system

The number two point is how we can establish the causes and effects, or how we can establish karma. Karma is established on the basis of two truths and that is the second point. The third point will ...

[Audience] establish the meaning of lack of inherent existence itself as absolute truth and then that relative truth does not contradict that.

[Rimpoche] I think that is the main point. And out of these three, actually establishing karma is not necessarily special to the Madhyamika, because everybody does establish Kharmic system. Point says two there are two truths, the karmic system is based on the two truths, and that is all not necessarily special to the Madhyamika. But the way and how they are present the two truths is slightly different from the usual way of presenting them. I think this point three is the major point, that out of the two truths, the lack of inherent existence is the absolute truth, and that truth does not contradict the relative truth. That is probably the most important point.

What is really happening here is that this third point is where they establish the base and the method and the result. They establish that on the basis of the two noble truths. I think that was the most difficult. What happens is that you will always be finding contradictions between the absolute truth and the relative truth. I think that is probably where we stopped. That brings us to the second point of the first one. There are so many of those. Number two of the first one. I mean the first of the last branch. The first one, is how are they contradicting the Madhyamika’s viewpoint. That is the point where we really stopped. Are you with me?

[Audience] We are the bottom third of page 130.

Scholars who are Buddhist essentialists may have great training in many topics of learning, but they do not accept the Madhyamaka view, and their dispute with the Madhyamikas is as follows: “If all phenomena are empty, lacking any essential or intrinsic nature, then all of the teachings on cyclic existence and nirvana—bondage, freedom, and so forth—are untenable.” p. 130

[Rimpoche] I think the Madhyamikas are giving great respect to those who are arguing here, by saying they are most learned and wonderful. However the point of the argument is very simple in one way; simple because they do not distinguish between intrinsic existence and existence. They do not distinguish between natural existence and existence. Even we, when we have no idea about this Madhyamika’s viewpoint, simply do not want to suddenly face the big question of whether we really do exist or not. That is why, last night I was saying that I do not like to use the word “intrinsic” in basic conclusion practice, because we immediately skip through something. We do not want to face the question of whether we exist or not, so immediately we put the shelter of this “intrinsic” and “natural” and all of those. That is a separate point that I raised last night.

The point here is that before we have any idea about reality, and the “natural” and “intrinsic”, and all of those, it is sort of simple and straightforward: if you have it you have it, if you don’t have it, you don’t have it. If you exist you exist, if you don’t exist, you don’t exist. So why are you talking about it? That is the point we get here. A number of times, a number of people will tell you that if it is the truth, it is the truth, there has to be one truth, there cannot be two truths. People tell you that, right?

So this distinction between intrinsic existence and existence does not come in, and they are saying here that they find it very difficult to distinguish between the natural intrinsic existence and just existing. The are thinking that if you do not exist naturally or intrinsically, then how can you exist at all? So they are raising a point: “Alright, you Madhyamikas say that every phenomenon is the lack of true existence. If that is the case then how can there be bondage, or liberation, or coming, going, sitting, all of those activities that we engage in every day, in everyday life, in samsara and in nirvana, and whatever we are going to have. How can you have this, because you just do not exist. Every phenomena does not exist.” That is the argument they are putting forward. And they do not just leave there, they go beyond and quote Nagarjuna’s Fundamental Treatise.

If all these were empty,

There would be no arising and no disintegration;

It would follow that for you

The four noble truths would not exist. p. 130

That is a quotation of Nagarjuna. But this quotation is not stating Nagarjuna’s own viewpoint. It is Nagarjuna’s viewpoint that if you misunderstand, then these are what is going to happen. But these essentialists bring this quote from Nagarjuna’s root text, and are saying that “If you Madhyamikas think those all lack intrinsic existence, if that is true, then in your system you will not have any interdependent system. Nor will you have production [Audience: in this translation they call it “arising and disintegration”] So if there is no dependent system, how can there be arising as well as disintegration? If that is not possible, then you do not have four noble truths, such as suffering, cause of suffering, cessation, and path. You don’t have either growth (arising) nor disintegration, so therefore you cannot have four noble truths. In that case in your Madhyamika’s system, nothing can ever exist at all.”

So that is the quotation of Nagarjuna’s. And they are arguing that if every phenomena is empty of inherent existence, then it should be free of arising and destruction, and you cannot establish the four noble truths. That is how the existentialistic argument goes. Also, they quote more from Nagarjuna’s Refutation of Objections (Vigraha-vyavartani), where Nagarjuna again presents the argument. They are very similar

If all things

Are completely without intrinsic nature,

Then your words also lack intrinsic nature

And cannot refute intrinsic existence. p. 131

So, they are saying: “In your system, everything lacks intrinsic existence, and if anyone has no intrinsic existence, then the word you say, saying “intrinsic existence”, is not possible. That very word that you use to try to destroy the reality of existence itself must lack intrinsic existence. If that is so, how can a non-existent word destroy the establishment of existence. Nagarjuna’s points that out. However, although it is Nagarjuna’s word, that does not mean it is Nagarjuna’s view. It is almost like Nagarjuna was quoting from somewhere else, where they said this and that. At the time when he was writing and composing those things, maybe those arguments had not yet started. But he was thinking about this and he started putting all this out, and it becomes convenient.

As I said earlier, in reality all of them truly have a true understanding of emptiness. But they take a side. They have to take a side and present the argument, so that in the future, when we look at it, we will know it. They take a side, for our benefit. I did even mention to you [in the story about Nagarjuna preparing Aryadeva for the debate] that Aryadeva thought Nagarjuna had become some kind of horrible materialistic person or something. So they do take the view of the other side. That is the system, not only during Nagarjuna’s and Chandrakirti’s time, but that is the system in Nalanda and Vikramsila, how they study. That is how they did, which continued at least until 1959 in Tibet. Even after that we do continue it a little bit. But until 1959 that is what happens. Some of the teachers do take the viewpoint – take the side – of different schools or tenant systems. Even now I think they do have some. It is interesting. I met Glenn Mullen in Chicago, and I was talking about this, and he said the Prasangika and Svantantrika do not make any sense to me, so I will simply follow the Lang kar shi pa do [lang kar gshegs pa*]. The Lang kar shipa do is the Lankavatara sutra. The Lankavatara sutra has the de shin nying po [de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po**], which means the essence of Tathagatagarba or Buddha nature. It is all technical language, isn’t it? Tathagatagarba is Buddha nature. Not really the Buddha nature we normally talk about, they have some kind of substance Buddha nature.

[Audience] ...... is translating that as “spiritual gene”

[Rimpoche] Anyway, that Buddha nature has nine different examples. A lot of Zen traditions follow that. I noticed that lot of those Zen teachers will come out in their major statement. If you look at it, they are following this Lang kar shi pa do. They give you nine different examples. Again, this point does not necessarily mean that Tathagatagarba or Buddha nature has not been accepted. However I don’t think the Tathagatagarba as presented with nine different examples is accepted here at all, because that becomes a big problem.

[Audience] Are the nine examples from Lankavatara or Uttaratantra sutras? The Uttaratantra has examples of Tathagatagarba.

[Rimpoche] I keep on thinking it is from Lang kar shi pa do, maybe I have forgotten. The Lang kar shi pa do and Uttaratantra will both have. The Lang kar shi pa do will give you all these nine points, exactly. Something like the lotus and essence, in the dirt you will find the stupas, there is a Buddha’s image, out of a rag you can find some, these are the examples they give you. So I think it is in the Lang kar shi pa do. The Uttaratantra might also have those, but I think it is in the Lang kar shi pa do.

Let’s get back to the point here. The third point is whether even though there is no intrinsic existence, yet you can still have the establishment of samsara and nirvana. So Tsongkhapa has one statement here saying these arguments are all coming because the existentialists think that the logic that refutes intrinsic existence will block every other activity. [Audience reads from page 131: “..then agents and objects of production are not tenable, and neither are the processes proof refutation and proof.”] The next sentence says that this argument is actually based on the fact that existentialists think that in the nature of emptiness you cannot establish anything else. That is the only reason why they are arguing. Now they say that the special distinguishing point of the Madhymaka is that even though you do not exist intrinsically, and nothing is ever there, however you can have growth, and who grows, and stopping, and creating, etc., all activities of samsara can be established here because in the 24th chapter of the Fundamental Treatise, Nagarjuna says:

The reductio expressing the fallacy that all is untenable

Is not right about emptiness;

Thus, forsaking emptiness, as you have,

Is not right for me.

For those to whom emptiness makes sense

Everything makes sense;

For those to whom emptiness does not make sense

Nothing makes sense. p. 131

That is the most important point that we need to spend time talking about.

Nagarjuna here is actually replying to the argument, in the 24th chapter. What he is saying here is that the materialist is arguing that we will not be able to establish the arising and destruction, etc.. That argument is not correct, because you [the materialist] do not understand the true nature of emptiness, and the purpose of emptiness is not known by you. That is why you are making that statement. We the Madhymikas accept “naturally empty”, and “naturally empty” is considered as emptiness. In our system, within that emptiness, we can establish activities: doing and who does. Your argument that these activities are not possible is not acceptable. Not only is it not acceptable, it is because of emptiness that all of these activities are able to happen. Because things are empty you can have growth. Because things are empty you can have destruction. You, the existentialist have misunderstood the emptiness, and you have mentioned so many faults, these faults probably destroyed the emptiness itself. But whatever you are saying about these faults, we do not have it. In other words, whatever problems you have raised because of our view, we will not have those problems. But actually, growing, destruction, and all activities are very possible because of emptiness.

In the Madhymaka system, we can establish emptiness that is empty of intrinsic existence. And in that system we can establish truth, interdependent nature, etc.. We can establish all of these. “Ones like you, who cannot accept that natural lack of intrinsic existence, will have difficulty to be able to establish these. To one who can accept emptiness, everything can be accepted, and to one who cannot accept emptiness, nothing can be accepted.” In other word the Madhyamika is turning the table around and saying, whatever you are telling me, we will not have that problem. But the way you accept emptiness, if that is the case, you will have a problem, because you establish intrinsic existence. Intrinsic existence does not give you room for change, therefore it becomes static. Because in your system, intrinsic existence and existence is one. That is why for whoever accepts lack of intrinsic existence, everything will be acceptable. One who can accept emptiness can have all these four noble truths, activities, etc.. One who has the true inherent existence cannot have them.

This is the point of debate. It is whether you can accept growth, destruction, etc., all activities, if for you it does not intrinsically exist. Or whether you can have it, if for you it does intrinsically exist. That is the subject of discussion.

[Rimpoche quotes an extensive verse] All faults come from the jig lta, or the reifying view of the perishable aggregates. We spent about two or three months on that verse. I completely forgot to summarize that last night. When I was driving up, someone mentioned that. The jig lta is a very important thing. Very similarly, these verses are very important. But, if we keep on spending two or three months on one verse we are not going to get anywhere.

Basically, that is the basis of the discussion here. What is the real emptiness? The Madhyamika will say “lack of intrinsic existence”. The existentialist will say “If you are not really there, you are not there”. In other words, truly if you are not there, how can you have all this? The Madhymaka explains: “When I say ‘truly’ it means something other than ‘I am just there’”. That is why you have heard the one statement you have heard. A number of times, during the Three Principles of the Path, wisdom aspect, here or there you have heard: “if you do not exist absolutely, that is not enough to be not existing, but if you exist relatively, that is good enough to be existing.” That is the point coming out of this. This debate is based on what empty really is.

Remember the basic outline here. We are still at the point of finding the object of refutation; what to refute. If it is too strong that is a problem. If it is too little is a problem. We are within that part of the outline. Then words like “intrinsic” and “natural” and “truly exist” all come up. The Madhyamika makes a big deal about saying “I am not truly existent, but I am relatively existent.” The normal existentialist will say “If you are truly not there, what are you talking about? You are just not there. Shut up.” Shut up because you can do nothing, you are not there.” That is exactly the bottom line of what they are saying. “You don’t even exist, so you words also do not exist. How can you expect non-existent words to destroy rue establishment?” That is a very valid point. Once we know this, I think it is not quite so difficult.

Even Nargajuna’s word will probably get cut into two. There are two different quotations. The one says “One who has the emptiness will have everything, and for the one who does not have the emptiness, nothing can be established.” Then the second quotation is “If they are all empty, how can there be growth and destruction, how can you have four noble truths?” When Tsongkhapa quotes that second point, I think I am shifting one point to another point. The second point I am trying to establish here is that even lack of intrinsic existence can still function as samsaric functioning, which means growth and all of this can happen. It should not ust say samsaric it should say samsara and nirvana function. Not only does lack of intrinsic existence let us establish or “have”, samsaric and nirvana function, but if there is intrinsic existence, samsara and nirvana cannot function. That is the third point we are trying to get here. The third point begins at just this word from Nagarjuna: “If all are empty, etc..” Can you read that verse, up to and including Chandrakirti’s Clear Words?

Nargajuna says the fallacies adduced by the essentialists, such as, “If all these are empty there would be no arising, and no disintegration...,” do not apply to those who advocate the absence of intrinsic nature. Moreover, he also says, that things such as production and disintegration are tenable within the positions of emptiness of intrinsic existence, whereas they are not tenable within the position that phenomena are not empty of intrinsic existence. Candrakirti’s Clear Words cites the passage, and explains:

Not only does the fallacy expressed in the reductio stated by the essentialists simply not apply to our position, but it is also the case that within our position all of the teachings on the four noble truths, etc. are quite correct. In order to indicate this, Nagarjuna said, “For those to whom emptiness makes sense....” p. 131

So this point here is not only that lack of intrinsic existence has all activities of nirvana, samsara, the four noble truth, but if you have intrinsic existence, then all of them are not possible. That is the bottom line here. Now we change to point three. That was the second point that we have just covered. The third point here is that the twelve inter-dependant links can be established on the lack of intrinsic existence. That is a very short word here.

The twenty-sixth chapter of Nagarjuna’s Fundamental Treatise teaches the stages of production in the forward progression of the twelve factors of dependent-arising and the stages of their cessation in the reverse progression. The other twenty-five chapters mainly refute intrinsic existence. p132

That’s it. Because we don’t leave anything out. What happens here is that if you do not have intrinsic existence, then you can work out the twelve links of the interdependent system. If you have intrinsic existence, then you cannot work out the twelve interdependent links, because ignorance remains ignorance, and creation remains creation, it all become static. So, when you look within the twelve links, the first is ignorance, second is creation, the third is consciousness, etc., up to old age and dying. All of them are able to function because there is no intrinsic existence. If you accept intrinsic existence these things cannot function.

I do not know if those existentialists turn the table round, and tell the Madhymikas: “For you true existence is permanent existence, are you thinking that way?” That is like the Madhyamika turning around and saying: “Whatever you are pointing out, we do not have this.” If the existentialist turns the table around and points out to the Madhyamika saying: “For you, intrinsic existence means a permanent existence, is that right?” What do we answer? Probably we say “It is”, because [for the existentialist] intrinsic is the absolute reality, truly and naturally. So, probably we will say “Yes”. I raise this question, because that way we will make it clear. We will escape out of the word “intrinsic” once again. It is sort of permanently existing. Solid, permanent, nothing changeable. Not impermanent. I mean, if the existentialist turns it around and says: “You mean to say my intrinsic existence is a permanent one, opposite of impermanent.” If it is a permanent one, then if the person remains forever, there will be no death, no birth. The existentialists here are not that crazy that they would say that there is no death and no birth. However, this argument is clearly indicating to us that in their mind, intrinsic reality, or intrinsic existence, is a permanent existence. If it is permanent you can do nothing, it is there. So there would be no four noble truths, there would be no interdependent system, and all of those. Anyway, let me try to finish a little more than this.

The fourth point again is about the 24th chapter.

The twenty-fourth chapter analyzes the four noble truths. It demonstrates at length that none of the teachings about cyclic existence and nirvana–arising, disintegration, etc.–makes sense in the context of non-emptiness of intrinsic existence, and how all of those do make sense within the context of emptiness of intrinsic existence. Hence, you must know how to carry the implications of this twenty-fourth chapter over to the other chapters.

That is the fourth point, which is really telling us again that the lack of intrinsic existence has four noble truth, can carry it and work. That is the bottom line of what it is saying. It also tells you that if you have intrinsic existence you cannot have growth, destruction, nirvana, samsara, everything cannot be. That is explained in detail in that twenty-fourth chapter. Tsongkhapa made one statement saying that whatever statement has been given in this chapter has to be carried out. The essence of the meaning has to be read or carried out on all chapters.

Again, the fifth point is very similar. In this system, the interdependentness can have everything. Actually, this is an extension of the earlier words that said “For one who can accept emptiness, everything can be accepted”.

Therefore, those who currently claim to teach the meaning of Madhyamaka are actually giving the position of the essentialists when they hold that all causes and effect–such as the agents and objects of production–are impossible in the absence of intrinsic existence. Thus, Nagarjuna the Protector holds that one must seek the emptiness of intrinsic existence and the middle way on the very basis of the teachings of cause and effect–that is, the production and cessation of specific effects in dependence upon specific causes and conditions. The twenty-fourth chapter [of Nagarjuna’s Fundamental Treatise] says:

That which arises dependently

We explain as emptiness.

This [emptiness] is dependent designation;

This is the middle way.

Because there is no phenomenon

That is not a dependent-arising,

There is no phenomenon

That is not empty.

Thus Nagarjuna says that dependent-arisings are necessarily empty of intrinsic existence. Do not turn this statement on its head by claiming that what is produced in dependence on causes and conditions must intrinsically exist. p. 132

This is the fifth point. Here it needs a little more explanation. In Nagarjuna’s system, this particular result is brought by this particular cause, by this particular condition, and that result is brought by that cause, etc. Growth and destruction, etc., are results of cause and effect. By looking through this, one will find the actual middle path. That is what we normally emphasize so much. Emptiness is found out of looking into interdependent nature. Interdependent nature is the essence of the emptiness. That is what this sentence is telling you. If you start searching for empty, you will not find it. If you look for zero, you will not find zero, there is nothing more to find except zero. So what happens when you are looking for zero, you look for what is happening. You look for the interdependent system. Out of the interdependent system, what you find is dependentness nature. When you find dependentness nature, it is lack of intrinsic existence. That is how one finds it, rather than looking into empty. This is what Nagarjuna’s quotation means.

Dependentness is the Madhyamaka point. Whatever is interdependent is, and that is emptiness. And this is dependent arising. This is the Madhyamaka. Therefore there is no such a phenomenon that ever existed that is not dependently arising. Therefore there is no phenomenon that is not an emptiness. Which means this is empty because it is dependently arising. Dependently arising has become the powerful reason for why it is empty. Whatever it is, a person, you, are empty, because you are dependently arising. Although in the Tibetan system you would say take the grain. The grain is empty because it is dependently arising. That is called the King of Logic. This is being established through here. Whatever is interdependent, or dependently arising, that itself is emptiness. It is said by Buddha. Why? Because Buddha taught this because of his experience. Remember: “One who knows, one who understands. You who expressed your understanding and your experience, that is why we consider you a great master.” That is the praise to Buddha.

Therefore, there is no phenomenon which ever existed that is not the nature of dependent arising. That makes us understand, that there is no phenomenon that is not emptiness. Again, form is empty, emptiness is form.

In other words, what is emptiness? Everything is emptiness. Every phenomenon is emptiness, because it exists dependently. What we do not know is how it is existing. We always think that there is something deep down that we can find. And it looks like layers have been put up, put up, put up. I have even heard some teachers teach that it is like you peel the peel from the fruit, peel the skin off the oranges, and then you are going to find an orange in there. In other words they are telling you there is an end of the Russian doll. Here they are telling you that because of dependent arising, there is nothing. When I am doing some workshop with some well-known teachers, I heard them keep on giving this orange example to establish semi-tathatagatagarba. Not true tathatagatagarba but semi-tathatagatagarba. They do that, because our mind is such that if we have it, if we exist, we really have to truly exist. That is why we search for it. In other words, if it is dependent arising, it has to be emptiness. That is Nagarjuna’s point. But you who try to interpret it differently, when the Nagarjuna says everything is dependent arising, therefore it is empty, you said because it is dependent on terms and conditions, therefore you have to be existing, which is turning Nagarjuna’s statement on its head. So that is the point here.

Now we have come to the sixth point. Maybe I should stop here, and we will do the sixth point, and more tomorrow.

End of the audio file titled 20051111GRNYWisD11

*according to the dictionary at www.diamondway-buddhism.org, lang kar gshegs pa is defined as: descent into lanka sutra {lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo}; Lankavatara sutra

**according to the dictionary at www.diamondway-buddhism.org, de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po is defined as: tathagata essence, tathagata-garbha. [buddha nature, enlightened essence]. tathagatagarbha, inherent Buddha nature; the tathagata essence, [buddha nature, enlightened essence], tathagata-garbha, tathagatagarbha/ buddha nature/ essence for attaining experience of suchness;

© 2005, Gehlek Rimpoche, All Rights Reserved