Archive Result

Title: Bodhisattva's Way of Life and Liberation in the Palm Wisdom Sections Summer

Teaching Date: 2013-07-12

Teacher Name: Gelek Rimpoche

Teaching Type: Summer Retreat

File Key: 20130704GRAASR/20130712GRAASR16.mp3

Location: Ann Arbor

Level 3: Advanced

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Soundfile 20130711GRAASR16

Speaker Gelek Rimpoche

Location Ann Arbor, MI

Topic Tibetan Buddism

Section 16

Transcriber Helen Breault

Date September 15, 2013

[Prayers and recitations to 21:58:6]

Thank you and welcome to today. Today is fourth day of the sixth month of the lunar calendar, which means Buddha's first teaching of dharma. And we're still talking the essence of dharma which is wisdom. And that is how we commemorate Buddha's teaching, which is considered the most important activity of a Buddha, is teaching. Which you just read it, in this dependent-originated prayers to Buddha. We just read it. What did you say, "[Tibetan 23:10-23:17]. Out of all the activities, the best activity of a Buddha is the speech activity. You have just read the verse there. Verse 52. We just read it.

So the speech, essence of the Buddha's speech boils down to compassion and love and wisdom. Love, compassion, and wisdom. And we're the wisdom part. Just try to follow Buddha mimicking and repeating the message. And mimicking Buddha and all that. From Buddha onward, Shantideva, Jamgong Je Tsongkhapa, Atisha, all of those continuously that's what it is, the essence of Tibetan Buddhism really is that. So that's what we tried to do.

So just remind you to generate a pure motivation and listen to this great teaching. And where we stopped yesterday is Verse 89 on p. 411 of the big book. How many verses are there now? One hundred sixty-seven. So we still have a lot. Which means I have to go a little faster.

༨༩

།སྟོབས་དང་ལྡན་པས་ཟིལ་མནན་ཕྱིར།།

།གལ་ཏེ་དེ་མྱོང་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།།

།གང་ཞིག་ཉམས་མྱོང་བདག་ཉིད་མིན།།

།དེ་ནི་ཚོར་བ་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡིན།།

89

STOBS DANG LDAN PAS ZIL MNAN PHYIRGAL TE DE MYONG MA YIN NAGANG ZHIG NYAMS MYONG BDAG NYID MIN

DE NA TSOR BA JI LTAR YIN

If the feeling fails to be experienced

Through being overwhelmed by something stronger,

How can “feeling” rightly be ascribed

To that which lacks the character of being felt?

Since it's not felt, it's not feeling, so that sort of argument ends there.

༩༠

།སྡུག་བསྔལ་ཕྲ་མོ་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད།།

།འདི་ཡི་རགས་པ་བསལ་མིན་ནམ།།

།དེ་ནི་དེ་ལས་གཞན་དགའ་ཙམ།།

།ཞེ་ན་ཕྲ་ཉིད་དེ་ཡང་དེའི།།

90

SDUG BSNGAL PHRA MO NYID DU YOD'DI YI RAGS PA BSAL MIN NAMDE NI DE LAS GZHAN DGA' TZAM

ZHE NA PHRA NYID DE YANG DE'I

Perhaps you say that only subtle pain remains,

Its grosser form has now been overmastered,

Or rather it is felt as mere pleasure.

But what is subtle still remains itself.

So when there's great joy, and then even there is a little suffering, but you don't experience the suffering. But if they say that. But the weak suffering is overpowered by great joy, but still there is a little suffering there and that much suffering one will experience. Vice versa, same thing. So what they're explaining here is the subtle joy is subtle joy, subtle suffering is subtle suffering. They're not really direct contradiction like light and darkness. So when you're feeling the joy you feel the joy, you're feeling the suffering you feel the suffering. But both suffering and joy powerful may not be experienced together. Anyway. So it's one affects the other, which also indicates non truly existing.

༩༡

།གལ་ཏེ་འགལ་རྐྱེན་སྐྱེས་པས་ན།།

།སྡུག་བསྔལ་སྐྱེས་པ་མིན་ན་ནི།།

།ཚོར་བ་རྟོག་པ་མངོན་ཞེན་ཉིད།།

།ཡིན་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་གྲུབ་མིན་ནམ།།

91

GAL TE 'GAL RKYEN SKYES PAS NASDUG BSNGAL SKYES PA MIN NA NITSOR BAR RTOG PA MNGON ZHEN NYID

YIN ZHES BYA BAR GRUB MIN NAM

If, through presence of its opposite,

Pain and sorrow fail to manifest,

To claim with such conviction that it’s felt

Is surely nothing more than empty words.

༩༢

།དེ་ཉིད་ཕྱིར་ན་འདི་ཡི་ནི།།

།གཉེན་པོར་རྣམ་དཔྱོད་འདི་བསྒོམ་སྟེ།།

།རྣམ་བརྟགས་ཞིང་ལས་བྱུང་བ་ཡི།།

།བསམ་གཏན་རྣལ་འབྱོར་པ་ཡི་ཟས།།

92

DE NYID PHYIR NA 'DI YI NIGNYEN PO RNAM DPYOD 'DI BSGOM STERNAM BRTAGS ZHING LAS BYUNG BA YI

BSAM GTAN RNAL 'BYOR PA YI ZAS

Since so it is, the antidote

Is meditation and analysis.

Investigation and resultant concentration

Is indeed the food and sustenance of yogis.

So when you eat the food it builds your strength and your body, likewise here meditating on this emptiness this will make the yogis to grow their quality far better, much faster, stronger. And especially, if you experience the feeling as a lack of true existence it helps not to grow the obsession. If there is no obsession there will be no rebirth in the samsara. So it is so important. Not only for the feeling. And if the feeling was understood as non-true existence, and then the touch, etc., will also be understood as lack of true substance. That similarity to this is I consciousness, or the I itself. All of those, touch means, all of those, consciousness and object and acknowledgement all together. So one of them will be extremely helpful.

༩༣

།གལ་ཏེ་དབང་དོན་བར་བ

ས་ན།།

།དེ་དག་གང་དུ་ཕྲད་པར་འགྱུར།།

།བར་མེད་ན་ཡང་ག

ིག་ཉིད་དེ།།

།གང་ཞིག་གང་དང་ཕྲད་པར་འགྱུར།།

93

GAL TE DBANG DON PAR BCAS NADE DAG GANG DU PHRAD PAR 'GYURBAR MED NA YANG GCIG NYID DE

GANG ZHIG GANG DANG PHRAD PAR 'GYUR

If between a sense power and a thing

There is a space, how will the two terms meet?

If there is no space, they form a unity,

And therefore, what is it that meets with what?

Nothing will meet with nothing then. The next will be:

༩༤

།རྡུལ་ཕྲན་རྡུལ་ཕྲན་ལ་འཇུག་མེད།།

།དེ་ནི་སྐབས་མེད་མཉམ་པ་ཡིན།།

།མ་ཞུགས་པ་ལ་འདྲེས་མེད་

ིང༌།།

།མ་འདྲེས་པ་ལ་ཕྲད་པ་མེད།།

94

RDUL PHRAN RDUL PHRAN LA 'JUG MEDDE NI SKABS MED MNYAM PA YINMA ZHUGS PA LA 'DRE MED CING

MA 'DRES PA LA PHRAD PA MED

Atoms and atoms cannot interpenetrate,

For they are equal, lacking any volume.

But if they do not penetrate, they do not mingle;

And if they do not mingle, there is no encounter.

So, that's sort of quite clear.

༩༥

།ཆ་མེད་པ་ལའང་ཕྲད་པ་ཞེས།།

།བྱ་བ་ཇི་ལྟར་འཐད་པར་འགྱུར།།

།ཕྲད་པ་དང་ནི་ཆ་མེད་པར།།

།གལ་ཏེ་མཐོང་ན་བསྟན་པར་གྱིས།།

95

CHA MED PA LA'ANG PHRAD PA ZHESBYA BA JI LTAR 'THAD PAR 'GYURPHRAD PA DANG NI CHA MED PAR

GAL TE MTHONG NA BSTAN PAR GYIS

For how could anyone accept

That what is partless could be said to meet?

And you must show me, if you ever saw,

A contact taking place between two partless things.

༩༦

།རྣམ་ཤེས་ལུས་མེད་པ་ལ་ནི།།

།ཕྲད་པ་འཐད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཉིད།

།ཚོགས་པའང་དངོས་པོ་མེད་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།།

།སྔར་ནི་ཇི་ལྟར་རྣམ་དཔྱད་བཞིན།།

96

RNAM SHES LUS MED PA LA NIPHRAD PA 'THAD PA MA YIN NYIDTSOGS PA'ANG DNGOS PO MED PHYIR TE

SNGAR NI JI LTAR RNAM DPYAD BZHIN

The consciousness is immaterial,

And so on cannot speak of contact with it.

A combination, too, has no reality,

And this we have already demonstrated.

The next is:

༩༧

།དེ་ལྟར་རེག་པ་ཡོད་མིན་ན།།

།ཚོར་བ་གང་ལས་འབྱུང་བར་འགྱུར།།

།ངལ་འདི་

ི་ཡི་དོན་དུ་ཡིན།།

།གང་གིས་གང་ལ་གནོད་པར་འགྱུར།།

97

DE LTAR REG PA YOD MIN NATSOR BA GANG LAS 'BYUNG BAR 'GYURNGAL 'DI CI YI DON DU YIN

GANG GIS GANG LA GNOD PAR 'GYUR

Therefore, if there is no touch or contact,

Whence is it that feeling takes its rise?

What purpose is there, then, in all our striving,

What is it, then, that torments what?

All right. That's quite clear. Because if that doesn't exist, what for?

༩༨

།གང་ཚེ་ཚོར་པོ་འགའ་མེད་

ིང༌།།

།ཚོར་བའང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ།།

།དེ་ཚེ་གནས་སྐབས་འདི་མཐོང་ནས།།

།སྲེད་པ་

ི་ཕྱིར་ལྡོག་མི་འགྱུར།།

98

GANG TSE TSOR PO 'GA' MED CINGTSOR BA'ANG YOD PA MA YIN PADE TSE GNAS SKABS 'DI MTHONG NAS

SRED PA CI PHYIR LDOG MI 'GYUR

Since there is no subject for sensation,

And sensation, too, lacks all existence,

Why, when this you clearly understand,

Will you not pause and turn away from craving?

༩༩

།མཐོང་བ་འམ་ནི་རེག་པ་ཡང༌།།

།རྨི་ལམ་སྒྱུ་འདྲའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱིས།།

།སེམས་དང་ལྷན་

ིག་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཕྱིར།།

།ཚོར་བ་དེ་ཡིས་མཐོང་མ་ཡིན།།

99

MTHONG BA'AM NI REG PA YANGRMI LAM SGYU 'DRA'I BDAG NYID KYISSEMS DANG LHAN CIG SKYES PA'I PHYIR

TSOR BA DE YIS MTHONG MA YIN

Seeing, then, and sense of touch

Are stuff of insubstantial dreams.

If perceiving consciousness arises simultaneously,

How could such a feeling be perceived?

So whether the feeling is seen by the mind at the same or earlier or later, or if it's the same it establishes it together, so all this so and forth. So that's okay.

༡༠༠

།སྔར་དང་ཕྱི་མར་སྐྱེས་པས་ཀྱང༌།།

།དྲན་པར་འགྱུར་གྱི་མྱོང་མ་ཡིན།།

།རང་གིས་བདག་ཉིད་མྱོང་མིན་ལ།།

།གཞན་དག་གིས་ཀྱང་མྱོང་མ་ཡིན།།

100

SNGAR DANG PHYI MAR SKYES PAS KYANGDRAN PAR 'GYUR GYI MYONG MA YINRANG GIS BDAG NYID MYONG MIN LA

GZHAN DAG GIS KYANG MYONG MA YIN

If the one arises first, the other after,

Memory occurs and not direct sensation.

Sensation, then, does not perceive itself,

And likewise, by another it is not perceived.

༡༠༡

།ཚོར་པོ་འགའ་ཡང་ཡོད་མིན་ཏེ།།

།དེས་ན་ཚོར་བ་དེ་ཉིད་མིན།།

།དེ་ལྟར་བདག་མེད་ཚོགས་འདི་ལ།།

།འདི་ཡིས་

ི་སྟེ་གནོད་པར་བྱ།།

101

TSOR BA 'GA' YANG YOD MIN TEDES NA TSOR BA DE NYID MINDE LTAR BDAG MED TSOGS 'DI LA

'DI YIS CI STE GNOD PAR BYA

The subject of sensation has no real existence,

Thus, sensation, likewise, has no being.

What damage, then, can be inflicted

On this aggregate deprived of self.

All right, so now probably we have come to the mind mindfulness.

༡༠༢

།ཡིད་ནི་དབང་རྣམས་ལ་མི་གནས།།

།གཟུགས་སོགས་ལ་མིན་བར་ནའང་མིན།།

།ནང་ཡང་སེམས་མིན་ཕྱི་མིན་ཞིང༌།།

།གཞན་དུ་ཡང་ནི་རྙེད་མ་ཡིན།།

102

YID NI DBANG RNAMS LA MI GNASGZUGS SOGS LA MIN BAR NA'ANG MINNANG YANG SEMS MIN PHYI MIN ZHING

GZHAN DU YANG NI RNYED MA YIN

The mind within the senses does not dwell;

It has no place in outer things, like form,

And in between, the mind does not abide:

Not out, not in, not elsewhere can the mind be found.

So, not found, so therefore truly doesn't exist. That's sort of it.

[38:02]

༡༠༣

།གང་ཞིག་ལུས་མིན་གཞན་དུའང་མིན།།

།འདྲེས་མིན་ལོགས་སུའང་འགར་མེད་པ།།

།དེ་ནི་

ུང་ཟད་མིན་དེའི་ཕྱིར།།

།སེམས་

ན་རང་བཞིན་མྱ་ངན་འདས།།

103

GANG ZHIG LUS MIN GZHAN DU MIN'DRES MIN LOGS SU'ANG 'GAR MED PADE NI CUNG ZAD MIN DE'I PHYIR

SEMS CAN RANG BZHIN MYA NGAN 'DAS

Something not within the body, and yet nowhere else,

That does not merge with it nor stand apart –

Something such as this does not exist, not even slightly.

Beings have nirvana by their nature.

If it truly exists, you cannot correct. When you cannot correct, there'll be no liberation. Similarly, those eye, ear conciousnesses, etc., neither in the subject what they perceived, nor base in which they live, neither on the combination, so there will be no base or point where the ear, nose, eye consciousness, etc. Some people say mind is not truly existing, but those five other senses, when they're perceiving other objects, then somebody who's managing, holding, still exists. There's the same thing with the argument with the past, present, future, etc. When they say that. It is the same when we talked about this eye consciousness, etc., whether they exist at the same time…Remember we talked earlier, a couple of verses. If it is the same time the consciousness becomes something else. If it's remembering later, then it's memory not consciousness and all of those. The same thing will apply.

This is the same argument which will continue:

༡༠༤

།ཤེས་བྱ་ལས་སྔར་ཤེས་ཡོད་ན།།

།དེ་ནི་

ི་ལ་དམིགས་ནས་སྐྱེ།།

།ཤེས་དང་ཤེས་བྱ་ལྷན་

ིག་ན།།

།དེ་ནི་

ི་ལ་དམིགས་ནས་སྐྱེ།།

104

SHES BYA LAS SNGAR SHES YOD NADE NI CI LA DMIGS NAS SKYESHES DANG SHES BYA LHAN CIG NA

DE NI CI LA DMIGS NAS SKYE

If consciousness precedes the cognized object,

With regard to what does it arise?

If consciousness arises with its object,

Again, regarding what does it arise?

So when you're looking at the form, etc., when you're perceiving, what has come earlier? The thing what you perceive or mind what you're perceiving? Thing what you're perceiving is the cause, mind what you're perceiving is the result. So without cause there'll be no result. If it came together, that's also not right. Cause and result cannot be together. Also, not only that, if it's together, what causes this eye consciousness? So all of those logical reasons will tell you, if it's something naturally existing, then it should be there. But it doesn't.

So now, this is a very big subject. One of those major explanations in the Madhymika thing. Maybe we have to leave it there and next probably is the phenomena mindfulness.

Two lines:

༡༠༥

།དེ་ལྟར་ཆོས་རྣམས་ཐམས་

ད་ཀྱི།།

།སྐྱེ་བ་རྟོགས་པར་འགྱུར་མ་ཡིན།།

DE LTAR CHOS RNAMS THAMS CAD KYI

SKYE BA RTOGS PAR 'GYUR MA YIN

105

Thus the origin of all phenomena

Lies beyond the reach of human understanding.

So, we have already negated mindfulness of body, mindfulness of feeling has rejected, negated the true existence of form, true existence of feeling. So that is similarly same thing for mental faculties and so and forth. All of them. If truly existing, then cause grow before or simultaneously grow, or later. All three are not right. So everything phenomena is not really truly existing. Neither it is created phenomena nor is it uncreated phenomena. Both did not exist truly. So therefore, every phenomena is lack of true existence. So that may be subject of your meditation.

Then next will be:

[Note to editors: in the copy I'm using of BSCharyavatara there seems to be an omission: the number for "106" and the first two lines of the Tibetan are missing]

།དེ་ཡང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་གཞན་གྱིས་ན།།

།སེམས་

ན་མྱ་ངན་ག་ལ་འདའ།།

106

GAL TE DE LTAR KUN RDZOB MEDDE LA BDEN GNYIS GA LA YODDE YANG KUN RDZOB GZHAN GYIS NA

SEMS CAN MYA NGAN GA LA 'DA'

“If this is so,” you say, “the relative will cease,

And then the two truths – what becomes of them?

If relative depends on beings’ minds,

This means nirvana is attained by none.”

I'm sorry I forgot to say: This is now the argument that debating two truths is not right. So that is they tried to negate that statement. That's what you just read. That is talking about the relative truth and absolute truth, how it is.

༡༠༧

།འདི་ནི་གཞན་སེམས་རྣམ་རྟོག་སྟེ།།

།དེ་ནི་རང་གི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་མིན།།

།ཕྱིས་དེ་ངེས་ན་དེ་ཡོད་དེ།།

།མིན་ན་ཀུན་རྫོབ་མེད་པ་ཉིད།།

107

'DI NI GZHAN SEMS RNAM RTOG STEDE NI RANG GI KUN RDZOB MINPHYIS DE NGES NA DE YOD DE

MIN NA KUN RDZOB MED PA NYID

This relative is just the thoughts of beings;

That is not the relative of beings in nirvana.

If thoughts comes after this, then that is still the relative;

If not, the relative has truly ceased.

༡༠༨

།རྟོག་དང་བརྟག་པར་བྱ་བ་དག།

།གཉིས་པོ་ཕན་ཚུན་བརྟེན་པ་ཡིན།།

།ཇི་ལྟར་གྲགས་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས།།

།རྣམ་པར་དཔྱད་པ་ཐམས་

ད་བརྗོད།།

108

RTOG DANG BRTAG PAR BYA BA DAGGNYIS PO PHAN TSUN BRTEN PA YINJI LTAR GRAGS PA LA BRTEN NAS

RNAM PAR DPYAD PA THAMS CAD BRJOD

Analysis and what is to be analyzed

Are linked together, mutually dependent.

It is on the basis of conventional consensus

That all examination is expressed.

Everything dependent, what you understand, who understood, all dependent. And therefore they're all relative truth. And relative truth, here, it means it appeared, there's a label, there's an understanding. That's just about it.

༡༠༩

།གང་ཚེ་རྣམ་པར་དཔྱད་པ་ཡི།།

།རྣམ་དཔྱོད་ཀྱིས་ནི་དཔྱོད་བྱེད་ན།།

།དེ་ཚེ་རྣམ་དཔྱོད་དེ་ཡང་ནི།།

།རྣམ་དཔྱོད་ཕྱིར་ན་ཐུག་པ་མེད།།

109

GANG TSE RNAM PAR DPYAD PA YIRNAM DPYOD KYIS NI DPYOD BYED NADE TSE RNAM DPYOD DE YANG NI

RNAM DPYOD PHYIR NA THUG PA MED

“But when the process of analysis

Is made in turn the object of our scrutiny,

This investigation, likewise, may be analyzed,

And thus we find an infinite regress.”

༡༡༠

།དཔྱད་བྱ་རྣམ་པར་དཔྱད་བྱས་ན།།

།རྣམ་དཔྱོད་ལ་ནི་རྟེན་ཡོད་མིན།།

།རྟེན་མེད་ཕྱིར་ན་མི་སྐྱེ་སྟེ།།

།དེ་ཡང་མྱ་ངན་འདས་པར་བརྗོད།།

110

DPYAD BYA RNAM PAR DPYAD BYAS NARNAM DPYOD LA NI RTEN YOD MINRTEN MED PHYIR NA MI SKYE STE

DE YANG MYA NGAN 'DAS PAR BRJOD

If phenomena are truly analyzed,

No basis for analysis remains.

Deprived of further object, it subsides.

That indeed is said to be nirvana.

Two verses.

And also said, if the analyzer is truly existent then whatever you analyze has to be truly existent. And that is the argument. So it's showing naturally there is truly existent nowhere. Even Nirvana is non-truly existent. And that is called "Temporary Clear Obstacle Nirvana."

༡༡༡

།གང་གི་ལྟར་ན་འདི་གཉིས་བདེན།།

།དེ་ཉིད་ཤིན་ཏུ་དཀའ་བར་གནས།།

།གལ་ཏེ་ཤེས་དབང་ལས་དོན་གྲུབ།།

།ཤེས་ཡོན་ཉིད་ལ་རྟེན་

ི་ཡོད།།

111

GANG GI LTAR NA 'DI GNYIS BDENDE NYID SHIN TU DKA' BAR GNASGAL TE SHES DBANG LAS DON GRUB

SHES YOD NYID LA RTEN CI YOD

Those who say that “both are true”

Are hard pressed to maintain their case.

If consciousness reveals the truth of things,

By what support is consciousness upheld?

And this is the "materialistic" they call it. Materialistic refers to the lower Buddhist schools. Materialistic says object and subject both are truly existent. And that has no proof of either perfect quotation of Buddha to prove this, nor logical reasons cannot prove. For that they think mind must be truly existing. That knowledgable mind is something behind the person, standing as a backbone. So that's what they're talking about. We have already established that self-reading, self-seeing is already negated. And is there another mind perceiving? Then there'll be endless minds you can go.

༡༡༢

།འོན་ཏེ་ཤེས་བྱ་ལས་ཤེས་གྲུབ།།

།ཤེས་བྱ་ཡོད་ལ་རྟེན་

ི་ཡོད།།

།དེ་སྟེ་ཕན་ཚུན་དབང་གིས་ཡོད།།

།གཉིས་ཀ་ཡང་ནི་མེད་པར་འགྱུར།།

112

'ON TE SHES BYA LAS SHES GRUBSHES BYA YOD LA RTEN CI YODDE STE PHAN TSUN DBANG GIS YOD

GNYI GA YANG NI MED PAR 'GYUR

If objects show that consciousness exists,

What, in turn, upholds the truth of objects?

If both subsist through mutual dependence,

Both thereby will lose their true existence.

If it's truly not existing, both mind and object that the mind perceives, then how can they be dependent? So that is the argument. But in their mind, if it exists it should be self-standing existence. And then:

༡༡༣

།གལ་ཏེ་བུ་མེད་ཕ་མིན་ན།།

།བུ་ཉིད་གང་ལས་བྱུང་བ་ཡིན།།

།བུ་མེད་པར་ནི་ཕ་མེད་པ།།

།དེ་བཞིན་དེ་གཉིས་མེད་པ་ཉིད།།

113

GAL TE BU MED PHA MIN NABU NYID GANG LAS BYUNG BA YINBU MED PAR NI PHA MED PA

DE BZHIN DE GNYIS MED PA NYID

If, without a child, a man cannot be a father;

Whence, indeed, will such a child arise?

There is no father in the absence of a child.

Just so, the mind and object have no true existence.

So it's all dependent.

༡༡༤

།མྱུ་གུ་ས་བོན་ལས་སྐྱེ་ཞིང༌།།

།ས་བོན་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་རྟོགས་བཞིན།།

།ཤེས་བྱ་ལས་སྐྱེས་ཤེས་པ་ཡིས།།

།དེ་ཡོད་པ་ནི་

ིས་མི་རྟོགས།།

114

MYU GU SA BON LAS SKYE ZHINGSA BON DE NYID KYIS RTOGS BZHINSHES BYA LAS SKYES SHES PA YIS

DE YOD PA NI CIS MI RTOGS

“The plant arises from the seed,” you say,

“So why should not the seed be thence inferred?

Consciousness arises from the object –

How does it not show the thing’s existence?”

So it is rises and then the mind is truly existent. That's what they understood.

༡༡༥

།མྱུ་གུ་ལས་གཞན་ཤེས་པ་ཡིས།།

།ས་བོན་ཡོད་

ེས་རྟོགས་འགྱུར་ན།།

།གང་ཕྱིར་ཤེས་བྱ་དེ་རྟོགས་པར།།

།ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་ཉིད་གང་ལས་རྟོགས།།

115

MYU GU LAS GZHAN SHES PA YISSA BON YOD CES RTOGS 'GYUR NAGANG PHYIR SHES BYA DE RTOGS PA

SHES PA YOD NYID GANG LAS RTOGS

A consciousness that’s different from the plant itself

Deduces the existence of the seed.

But what will show that consciousness exists,

Whereby the object is itself established?

They said their argument is not correct because seed, the shoot, etc. But shoot itself did not see it.

Now that probably will be that much argument and debate on the two truths. So now it comes the reasons why there is no self, self-less, truth-less, all of them have to be established by little thoughts. And they are such as Vajra-logical, dependent-arise logic, and there exists non-exists point of logic.

First the vajra thing:

༡༡༦

།རེ་ཞིག་འཇིག་རྟེན་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས།།

།རྒྱུ་རྣམས་ཐམས་

ད་མཐོང་བ་ཡིན།།

།པདྨའི་སྡོང་བུ་སོགས་དབྱེ་ནི།།

།རྒྱུ་ཡི་དབྱེ་བས་བསྐྱེད་པ་ཡིན།།

116

RE ZHIG 'JIG RTEN MNGON SUM GYISRGYU RNAMS THAMS CAD MTHONG BA YINPADMA'I SDONG BU SOGS DBYE NI

RGYU YI DBYE BAS BSKYED PA YIN

At times direct perception of the world

Perceives that all things have their causes.

The different segments of the lotus flower

Arise from a similar diversity of causes.

༡༡༧

།རྒྱུ་དབྱེ་གང་གིས་བྱས་ཤེ་ན།།

།སྔར་གྱི་རྒྱུ་དབྱེ་ཉིད་ལས་སོ།།

ི་ཕྱིར་རྒྱུ་ཡིས་འབྲས་སྐྱེད་ནུས།།

།སྔར་གྱི་རྒྱུ་ཡི་མཐུ་ཉིད་ལས།།

117

RGYU DBYE GANG GIS BYAS ZHE NASNGAR GYI RGYU DBYE NYID LAS SOCI PHYIR RGYU YIS 'BRAS SKYED NUS

SNGAR GYI RGYU YI MTHU NYID LAS

“But what gives rise,” you ask, “to such diversity of causes?”

An ever-earlier variety of cause, we say.

“And how,” you ask, “do certain fruits derive from certain causes?”

Through the power, we answer, of preceding causes.

[58:23]

We came to the point of establishing through logically the point of the self-less. Self doesn't exist truly. Just by saying doesn't exist true is not enough. And it has to be established logically. For that you had [58:59 Tib] diamond slivers or diamond splinters. Maybe "vajra" is diamond in that case, diamond splinters. "Dorje sem me"[?Tib 59:26] that is one. Then dependent origination is two. And then the third one is "yemay kengor…" [Tib 59:34] neither exist nor exists, negating from growing from existing, negating from growing from non-existence. So "yemay kengor" [Tib 59:49]. Is there a name for that?

So anyway there are three points. First point is the diamond splinter. Okay. Diamond splinter.

༡༡༦

།རེ་ཞིག་འཇིག་རྟེན་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས།།

།རྒྱུ་རྣམས་ཐམས་

ད་མཐོང་བ་ཡིན།།

།པདྨའི་སྡོང་བུ་སོགས་དབྱེ་ནི།།

།རྒྱུ་ཡི་དབྱེ་བས་བསྐྱེད་པ་ཡིན།།

116

RE ZHIG 'JIG RTEN MNGON SUM GYISRGYU RNAMS THAMS CAD MTHONG BA YINPADMA'I SDONG BU SOGS DBYE NI

RGYU YI DBYE BAS BSKYED PA YIN

At times direct perception of the world

Perceives that all things have their causes.

The different segments of the lotus flower

Arise from a similar diversity of causes.

༡༡༧

།རྒྱུ་དབྱེ་གང་གིས་བྱས་ཤེ་ན།།

།སྔར་གྱི་རྒྱུ་དབྱེ་ཉིད་ལས་སོ།།

ི་ཕྱིར་རྒྱུ་ཡིས་འབྲས་སྐྱེད་ནུས།།

།སྔར་གྱི་རྒྱུ་ཡི་མཐུ་ཉིད་ལས།།

117

RGYU DBYE GANG GIS BYAS ZHE NASNGAR GYI RGYU DBYE NYID LAS SOCI PHYIR RGYU YIS 'BRAS SKYED NUS

SNGAR GYI RGYU YI MTHU NYID LAS

“But what gives rise,” you ask, “to such diversity of causes?”

An ever-earlier variety of cause, we say.

“And how,” you ask, “do certain fruits derive from certain causes?”

Through the power, we answer, of preceding causes.

So now when we say things rise from cause, if rise from cause, whether the cause exists or non-existent cause. So you can't be a third one. If it's existent one, so now you know "vajra splinter" pieces. And that is about four piece: that is self, other, both, causeless. Self, others, both, causeless. So either if it's grown out of a cause, the cause has to be. If the cause is exists, which end it is: self, both, others, or both together, or no cause. So talking about it, every phenomena is growth or growing or existence. "Grow" here does not necessarily refer to the growing tree, or growing kids, or not that type. Not necessarily that type, but it also can be existing. Though existence is not true because neither from self nor from other nor from both, neither from the causeless. So that is the reasons given.

So when you talk about the logic, this system will point it out base on which you're arguing, base on which you're talking, not arguing. (That is sort of bad habit of me. Every debate is argument, and every conversation becomes argument. And that's not right. But it's not.) Base on which you're talking is the foundation, ground on which we are discussing. You know we're talking about this, we're talking that, in our normal conversation. So here we are talking about existence is base. What you try to establish is the growing or growth or existing or developing is not true. Because if it is true it has without the reason. It has to be either from me or self or others or both or causeless. So none of them is. Therefore, its growth is not true. We're talking about the birth, or existing, or growing. So that is how it goes.

Some of the early either pre-Buddhist or whatever, some of them says not only everything does not depend, there's nothing such depending on a cause at all like that of peacock's feather. Nobody made peacock's feather such an attractive, beautiful color combination. No one made the thorns sharp. No one made it. So they said it is natural, no one made it. Peacock's feather is natural, the sharpness on thorns is natural. No one made it.

So for which they say, "Well, things are growing from evolution. Everybody sees everybody knows. So nothing to talk about it." That's the reply. Evolution is evolution; the seed and moisture and fertilizers and the shoots growing. It becomes the grain. That's the evolution I'm talking about. That everybody knows. So nothing to talk about it.

But then some other, again pre-Buddhist says the lotus flower has so many different color. But not necessarily lotus. I think they're talking about lotus as example.

[1:08:39]

Not as example as lotus itself. The name "lotus" applies on many flowers. So "flower" they should have said. Flowers have many different colors. What is the cause? What cause made this many different flower colors? He says, "yeah, but, the petals, branches, stem, etc., also depends on the cause. Cause also have many different causes. So therefore, this is not grown out of no cause." So they said, "Who made this multicolor flower? There's no cause." And then they said, "Yeah, there is so many different causes. Not only the multicolor, the leaves, branches, twigs. All of them have a separate cause."

Again, some of them argue, "Who made, what becomes the cause different? And if you say that cause is earlier, then there will be no ending to it. And if there is no someone who's making those causes, then it becomes causeless." And then replying, they're saying, "The all different divisions of cause are the continuation of earlier cause. Earlier different causes will give you future different result. And your problem that there'll be no ending to it. And then said, we Madhyamikas accept no ending of the cause because we say there is no beginning in samsara.

So now here the point is: cause is continued. One result is cause of something, that is something, that is something. There will be no beginning. That's the reason why Madhyamikans say the rebirth, reincarnation, rebirth has no beginning. And that's what is one of the principles, there's no beginning.

Remember yesterday or day before yesterday it came? Buddha had been asked whether there is beginning and end of samsara, and that's very famous story anyway. And Buddha kept quiet and silent. And this is extraordinary, blah, blah, blah. And particularly I remember when I was young in India, those Indian Buddhist professors, especially of the Delhi Buddhist University, now I've forgotten his name…Anyway, all of them will make a big deal, "Asked the question, Buddha became silent." They make all that big deal. Many of the Indian professors do anyway, right. So "Buddha became silent…" For a while quiet, and then they say, "What does that mean?"

Anyway, so we do have a verse there in the Pema Durba [TIb 1:13:54]. Chandragomi wrote prayers to the Buddha and that says [1:14:11 Tib]. So Chandragomi praised the Buddha. "When people asked you is there beginning or end to samsara you did not reply. By not replying the profound point, like this, by not speaking in public, people understood you're great." Or something. Something like that. So that's what it's talking about.

So the Madhyamikans do accept there is no beginning of cause, because causes are continuous. Because they accept samsara continues, person continues, people, being, everything continues. No beginning. That's the reason why the cause continues is acceptable. So ending of cause, meaning no beginning of the cause, never pointed out. That is accepted.

[1:16:23 Tib] Why they did not accept beginning of the cause, because samsara has no beginning.

So another question: How can different cause can bring different result? Some are strong, some are weak, whatever different, why? Some can, some cannot. Why? And reason is there are causes also have its own power, its own value. And because they're all similar causes. Because of that it is not causeless. Then they say, "Well then, different cause will bring different result. Other causes bring other result." In other words, not the same thing. Not similarity, completely separate cause brings completely non-connected result can be brought. And for which the Madhyamikans say, "Growing from the others, not from self, but from the others is already established, such as impermanent causes cannot bring permanent result, etc. We have already established. But that impermanent cause and permanent cause, the impermanent cause we have to explain it because this direct word here in this chapter nine does not really state that.

So this is like this: It's the same old thing. It is earlier result, or same time, or the future. So, it's not right, already established and then it becomes causeless. So it is not done earlier. So it is equal time, same time, then it's not the result coming from the cause because they're same time. Because the result has to be later, cause has to be earlier, when they come together then it's not right. Is there a gap between the cause and result? If there is gap, separate gap, then another thing comes in between the cause and the result. If there is no gap, then cause and result will become same time. Such is never possible. Some may say, some parts have gap, some doesn't have a gap. If that is the case, result and the cause becomes different parts and parcels. That's also not right. So anyway that's not truly existent because it cannot stand by itself and it depends on the part and parcel. And therefore, truly or naturally existence is no longer acceptable.

Now from the permanent source. That's the permanent source.

༡༡༨

།དབང་ཕྱུག་འགྲོ་བའི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ན།།

།རེ་ཞིག་དབང་ཕྱུག་གང་ཡིན་སྨོས།།

།འབྱུང་རྣམས་ཤེ་ན་དེ་ལྟ་མོད།།

།མིང་ཙམ་ལ་ཡང་

ི་ཞིག་ངལ།།

118

DBANG PHYUG 'GRO BA'I RGYU YIN NARE ZHIG DBANG PHYUG GANG YIN SMROS'BYUNG RNAMS ZHE NA DE LTA MOD

MING TZAM LA YANG CI ZHIG NGAL

If Ishvara is held to be the cause of beings,

You must now define for us his nature.

If, by this, you simply mean the elements,

No need to tire ourselves disputing names!

So well here we use Ishvara by name. But it's not only the Ishvara alone. There are schools that thought everything is created by Ishvara. And then the question is, "What is Ishvara? Who is Ishvara?" And then the definition of the Ishvara for them is something permanent, something naturally can, something total knowledge. And that one created every existence. And everything. The samsara, the environment, inhabitants, everything is created by this creator. Because creator is the cause of everything.

So the Madhyamikas argue, "What are you talking about the Ishvara? What type or what is it? What is it? There is no permanent, we already established. And there is no self-standing. We have already established that. What type, kind you're talking about it?"

Some say the elements are labeled as Ishvara. And that is useless argument. That is useless, taking hardship. The elements, there's no reason why elements are Ishvara.

༡༡༨

།དབང་ཕྱུག་འགྲོ་བའི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ན།།

།རེ་ཞིག་དབང་ཕྱུག་གང་ཡིན་སྨོས།།

།འབྱུང་རྣམས་ཤེ་ན་དེ་ལྟ་མོད།།

།མིང་ཙམ་ལ་ཡང་

ི་ཞིག་ངལ།།

119

'ON KYANG SA SOGS DU MA DANGMI RTAG G-YO MED LHA MIN ZHING'GOM BYA NYID DANG MI GTZANG BAS

DE NI DBANG PHYUG NYID MA YIN

Yet earth and other elements are many,

Impermanent, inert, without divinity.

Trampled underfoot, they are impure,

And thus they cannot be a God Omnipotent.

༡༢༠

།དབང་ཕྱུག་མཁའ་མིན་གཡོ་མེད་ཕྱིར།།

།བདག་མིན་སྔར་ནི་བཀག་ཟིན་ཕྱིར།།

།བསམ་མིན་པ་ཡི་བྱེད་པོ་ཡང༌།།

།བསམ་མིན་བརྗོད་པས་

ི་ཞིག་བྱ།།

120

DBANG PHYUG MKHA' MIN G-YO MED PHYIRBDAG MIN SNGAR NI BKAG ZIN PHYIRBSAM MIN PA YI BYED PO YANG

BSAM MIN BRJOD PAS CI ZHIG BYA

The Deity cannot be Space – inert and lifeless.

He cannot be the Self, for this we have refuted.

He’s inconceivable, they say. Then likewise his creatorship.

Is there any point, therefore, to such a claim?

They say element, etc., are not Ishvara because that is separate material. It has developing, destruction, and impermanent. And element doesn't have a mind of making it before, before it becomes. So it is not movable. They call it "movable." Neither is it God, nor is it something you can jump over.

You know it is the early Indian culture, if you walk over something it is really disrespectful. In our culture people jump over people. People lying down and somebody will walk over is no problem. In Asian and particularly Indian culture, if you jump over somebody's head it is really considered terrible thing. It's sort of horrendous behavior in that culture. That's why they say you can't jump over [tib. 1:28:49] Ishvara because it is object of worship, object of respect, object of worship. (Some people have to go now because… I'm sorry).

1:29:09

Elements also have impure nature. So what you accept, Ishvara, is independent self, permanent, created everything by movement of your thoughts. It is the God. It is absolutely pure and it can't be jumped over by leg, meaning you can't jump over. And that is one of the reasons why the Buddhist texts and pictures, etc., if you jump over it's breaking the refuge vow. It's because very strong Indian culture influence. And there are a lot of culture things too. And that's the reason why we provide a separate table to put the dharma things. Because we don't want to jump over. That's the simple reason, may be Indian culture. But when it's the culture and it's been going through generations, it becomes Buddhist culture. So that's the reason why. So whatever you have accepted, Ishvara, and this are totally different. So it's not what you said it is.

Again some others argue, "elements, etc., not Ishvara, but space is Ishvara." For which, space is not Ishvara because space is not created because it has no activities. If there's no activity, there is no creating things by the movement, by the thought of your mind.

Then some pre-Buddhist school says, "Whatever you're calling 'self,' 'I', that is Ishvara, that is creator created. So that is the Ishvara." So for that we already refuted that self as things and self as mind, both we already refuted. Not only that, self is with everybody. Everybody has it. And your Ishvara is extraordinary. Everybody don't have it. So therefore it's not. It's not what you accept as Ishvara is not this.

Then some will say that Ishvara is not something you think about it. Ishvara is somebody who's doing it. You don't think about it, but who does it. So alright, so if you cannot even think then how can you do? It is not even possible. That's, I think, about it.

༡༢༡

།དེས་བསྐྱེད་འདོད་པའང་གང་ཞིག་ཡིན།།

།བདག་ནི་དེ་དང་ས་སོགས་དང༌།།

།དབང་ཕྱུག་ངོ་བོའང་རྟག་མིན་ནམ།།

།ཤེས་པ་ཤེས་བྱ་ལས་སྐྱེ་དང༌།།

121

DES BSKYED 'DOD PA'ANG GANG ZHIG YINBDAG NI DE DANG SA SOGS DANGDBANG PHYUG NGO BO'ANG RTAG MIN NAM

SHES PA SHES BYA LAS SKYE DANG

What is it he wishes to create?

Has he made the self and all the elements?

But are not self and elements and he, himself, eternal?

And consciousness, we know, arises from its object.

[122 1st two lines]

༡༢༢

།ཐོག་མེད་བདེ་སྡུག་ལས་ལས་ཡིན།།

།དེ་བས་གང་ཞིག་བསྐྱེད་པ་སྨོས།།

122

THOG MED BDE SDUG LAS LAS YINDE YIS GANG ZHIG BSKYED PA SMROS

Pain and pleasure have, from all time, sprung from karma,

So tell us, what has this Divinity produced?

Right. And Ishvara, etc., you consider it is permanent. Permanent doesn't have movement of growth and growing and all that. In other words, cause and result is only applicable for impermanent things, not permanent. Permanent, you know because cause and result changes. Changeable is only possibly in impermanent. Permanent doesn't change. Permanent is permanent, right? Permanent doesn't change.

We may think Statue of Liberty or something is permanent. But Statue of Liberty is impermanent. It's not permanent. Statue of Liberty, etc., are impermanent because it is cause and conditions created and it goes down too. Because last time, when I was in New York, not last time but some time ago, and I saw this head, the head of the Statue of Liberty in some backyard and they're painting. Because when the French offered to the Americans the Statue of Liberty it's a long time ago. So it's getting deteriorated in the past. So they're painting or whatever it is is. Which indicates it's impermanent, because quality deteriorated. Which is change, which is impermanent. So cause and result. Everything created are impermanent. Everything not created, true naturally existent, such as space or enlightenment, etc., not individually enlightened or collectively enlightened, are permanent. But Buddha, impermanent. Englightened beings, impermanent. Enlightenment is permanent.

So anyway the cause and result are only applicable to permanent. So they're not the result of Ishvara, self, and elements, the subtle elements. They're not result of Ishvara because it's permanent. You consider Ishvara as something permanent. So permanent doesn't have something growing, something make it grow. So that's the major argument.

Not only that, all the consciousness are grown out of consciousness. The rigpa or the clear lucid nature is continuation of its own, so it's right from the beginning there is something which is continuing. And today what we feel, occupy, engage of that lucid consciousness is continuation of that lucid consciousness. Joy, suffering, etc., is the result of positive and negative deeds so it is not the creation of Ishvara. So that established self, and element, etc., not creation of Ishvara. Not only that, it also has to be negated, Ishvara as cause. And for that:

[2nd half of 122]

།རྒྱུ་ལ་ཐོག་མ་ཡོད་མིན་ན།།

།འབྲས་བུའི་ཐོག་མ་ག་ལ་ཡོད།།

RGYU LA THOG MA YOD MIN NA

'BRAS BU'I THOG MA GA LA YOD

And if creation’s cause is unoriginate,

How can origin be part of the result?

[1st half of 123]

༡༢༣

།རྟག་ཏུ་

ི་ཕྱིར་བྱེད་མིན་ཏེ།།

།དེ་ནི་གཞན་ལ་ལྟོས་པ་མིན།།

123

RTAG TU CI PHYIR BYED MIN TEDE NI GZHAN LA LTOS PA MIN

Why are creatures not created constantly,

For Ishvara relies on nothing but himself?

If the cause is permanent, the results are permanent, so today's joy and suffering also right from the beginning you have that sort of argued point here.

Then,

[2nd half of 123]

།དེས་བྱས་མིན་གཞན་ཡོད་མིན་ན།།

།དེས་འདི་གང་ལ་ལྟོས་པར་འགྱུར།།

DES BYAS MIN GZHAN YOD MIN NA

DES 'DI GANG LA LTOS PAR 'GYUR

And if there’s nothing that he has not made,

What remains on which he might depend?

༡༢༥

།གལ་ཏེ་དབང་ཕྱུག་མི་འདོད་བཞིན།།

།བྱེད་ན་གཞན་གྱི་དབང་དུ་ཐལ།།

།འདོད་ནའང་འདོད་ལ་རག་ལས་འགྱུར།།

།བྱེད་ནའང་དབང་ཕྱུག་ག་ལ་ཡིན།།

124

GAL TE LTOS NA TSOGS PA NYIDRGYU YIN 'GYUR GYI DBANG PHYUG MINTSOGS NA MI SKYE DBANG MED CING

DE MED PAR NI SKYE DBANG MED

If Ishvara depends, the cause of all

Is prior circumstances, and no longer he.

When these obtain, he cannot but create;

When these are absent, he is powerless to make

༡༢༥

།གལ་ཏེ་དབང་ཕྱུག་མི་འདོད་བཞིན།།

།བྱེད་ན་གཞན་གྱི་དབང་དུ་ཐལ།།

།འདོད་ནའང་འདོད་ལ་རག་ལས་འགྱུར།།

།བྱེད་ནའང་དབང་ཕྱུག་ག་ལ་ཡིན།།

125

GAL TE DBANG PHYUG MI 'DOD BZHINBYED NA GZHAN GYI DBANG DU THAL'DOD NA'ANG 'DOD LA RAG LAS 'GYUR

BYED NA'ANG DBANG PHYUG GA LA YIN

If almighty God does not intend,

But yet creates, another thing has forced him.

If he wishes to create he’s swayed by his desire.

Even though Creator, then, what becomes of his omnipotence?

So it almost doesn't need a good explanation here.

Two lines:

༡༢༦

།གང་དག་རྡུལ་ཕྲན་རྟག་སྨྲ་བ།།

།དེ་དག་ཀྱང་ནི་སྔར་བཟློག་ཟིན།།

126

GANG DAG RDUL PHRAN RTAG SMRA BADE DAG KYANG NI SNGAR BZLOG ZIN

Those who say that atoms are the permanent foundation

Have indeed already been refuted.

Okay.

[2nd half of 126]

།གཙོ་བོ་རྟག་པ་འགྲོ་བ་ཡི།།

།རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པར་ནི་གྲངས་

ན་འདོད།།

GTZO BO RTAG PA 'GRO BA YI

RGYU YIN PAR NI GRANGS CAN 'DOD

The Samkhyas are the ones who hold

The Primal Substance as enduring cause.

༡༢༧

།སྙིང་སྟོབས་རྡུལ་དང་མུན་པ་ཞེས།།

།བྱ་བའི་ཡོན་ཏན་མཉམ་གནས་ནི།།

།གཙོ་བོ་ཞེས་བྱར་རབ་བརྗོད་དེ།།

།མི་མཉམ་འགྲོ་བ་ཡིན་པར་བརྗོད།།

127

SNYING STOBS RDUL DANG MUN PA ZHESBYA BA'I YON TAN MNYAM GNAS NIGTZO BO ZHES BYAR RAB BRJOD DE

MI MNYAM 'GRO BA YIN PAR BRJOD

“Pleasure,” “pain,” “neutrality,” so-called,

Are qualities that, when they rest

In equilibrium, are termed the Primal Substance.

The universe arises when they are disturbed.

[128 first 2 lines]

༡༢༨

།ག

ིག་ལ་རང་བཞིན་གསུམ་ཉིད་ནི།།

།རིགས་མིན་དེས་ན་དེ་ཡོད་མིན།།

128

GCIG LA RANG BZHIN GSUM NYID NIRIGS MIN DES NA DE YOD MIN

Three natures in a unity are disallowed;

This unity, therefore, cannot exist.

The main idea here is it is pairless principle, nothing can pair up, which has three qualities you taught, and that's not possible. That's not possible because if there is not one, there cannot be many. So it's not even possible, therefore it doesn't exist at all. So that is the major point raising.

[2nd half of 128]

།དེ་བཞིན་ཡོན་ཏན་ཡོད་མིན་ཏེ།།

།དེ་ཡང་སོ་སོར་རྣམ་གསུམ་ཕྱིར།།

DE BZHIN YON TAN YOD MIN TE

DE YANG SO SOR RNAM GSUM PHYIR

These qualities, likewise, have no existence,

For they must also be assigned a triple nature.

[129 first 2 lines]

༡༢༩

།ཡོན་ཏན་མེད་ན་སྒྲ་སོགས་ཀྱང༌།།

།ཡོད་ཉིད་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྒྱང་རིང་འགྱུར།།

129

YON TAN MED NA SGRA SOGS KYANGYOD NYID SHIN TU RGYANG RING 'GYUR

If these qualities have no existence,

A thing like sound is very far from plausible!

I think if you have a lot of time, you can talk a lot here. You can discuss a lot of things, but maybe not.

[2nd half of 129]

།སེམས་མེད་གོས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ།།

།བདེ་སོགས་ཡོད་པ་སྲིད་པའང་མིན།།

SEMS MED GOS LA SOGS PA LA

BDE SOGS YOD PA SRID PA'ANG MIN

And cloth, and other mindless objects,

Cannot be the seat of feelings such as pleasure.

༡༣༠

།དངོས་རྣམས་དེ་རྒྱུའི་རང་བཞིན་ན།།

།དངོས་པོ་རྣམ་དཔྱོད་ཟིན་མིན་ནམ།།

།ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་ཡང་བདེ་སོགས་ཉིད།།

།དེ་ལས་སྣམ་སོགས་འབྱུང་བའང་མེད།།

130

DNGOS RNAMS DE RGYU'I RANG BZHIN NADNGOS PO RNAM DPYAD MA ZIN NAMKHYOD KYI RGYU YANG BDE SOGS NYID

DE LAS SNAM SOGS 'BYUNG BA'ANG MED

“But,” you say, “these things possess the nature of their cause.”

But have we not investigated “things” already?

For you the cause is pleasure and the like,

But from pleasure, cloth has never sprung!

༡༣༡

།སྣམ་སོགས་ལས་ནི་བདེ་སོགས་ཡིན།།

།དེ་མེད་ཕྱིར་ན་བདེ་སོགས་མེད།།

།བདེ་སོགས་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཡང༌།།

།ནམ་ཡང་དམིགས་པ་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།།

131

SNAM SOGS LAS NI BDE SOGS YINDE MED PHYIR NA BDE SOGS MEDBDE SOGS RTAG PA NYID DU YANG

NAM YANG DMIGS PA YOD MA YIN

Pleasure, rather, is produced from cloth,

But this is nonexistent, therefore pleasure likewise.

As for permanence of pleasure and the rest –

Well, there’s a thing that’s never been observed.

༡༣༢

།བདེ་སོགས་གསལ་བ་ཡོད་ཉིད་ན།།

།མྱོང་བ་

ི་ཕྱིར་འཛིན་མ་ཡིན།།

།དེ་ཉིད་ཕྲ་མོར་གྱུར་ན་དེ།།

།རགས་དང་ཕྲ་བའང་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡིན།།

132

BDE SOGS GSAL BA YOD NYID NAMYONG BA CI PHYIR 'DZIN MA YINDE NYID PHRA MOR GYUR NA DE

RAGS DANG PHRA BA'ANG JI LTAR YIN

If pleasure and the rest are true existents,

Why are they not constantly perceived?

And if you claim they take on subtle form,

How can coarseness change, transforming into subtlety?

༡༣༣

།རགས་པ་དོར་ནས་ཕྲ་འགྱུར་བས།།

།ཕྲ་རགས་དེ་དག་མི་རྟག་ཉིད།།

།དེ་བཞིན་དངོས་པོ་ཐམས་

ད་ནི།།

།མི་རྟག་ཉིད་དུ་

ིས་མི་འདོད།།

133

RAGS PA DOR NAS PHRA GYUR PASPHRA RAGS DE DAG MI RTAG NYIDDE BZHIN DNGOS PO THAMS CAD NI

MI RTAG NYID DU CIS MI 'DOD

If coarseness is abandoned, subtlety assumed,

Such transition indicates impermanence.

Why then not accept that, in this way,

All things will have the character of transience?

༡༣༤

།རགས་པ་བདེ་ལས་གཞན་མིན་ན།།

།བདེ་བ་གསལ་བར་མི་རྟག་ཉིད།།

།གལ་ཏེ་མེད་པ་འགའ་ཡང་ནི།།

།སྐྱེ་མིན་མེད་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་འདོད་ན།།

134

RAGS PA BDE LAS GZHAN MIN NABDE BA GSAL BA MI RTAG NYIDGAL TE MED PA 'GA' YANG NI

SKYE MIN MED PHYIR ZHES 'DOD NA

If you say the coarser aspect is itself the pleasure,

The manifest sensation is of course impermanent.

And what does not exist in any sense,

Because it has no being, cannot manifest.

༡༣༥

།གསལ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱེ་བར་ནི།།

།ཁྱོད་མི་འདོད་ཀྱང་གནས་པ་ཉིད།།

།གལ་ཏེ་རྒྱུ་ལ་འབྲས་གནས་ན།།

།ཟན་ཟ་མི་གཙང་ཟ་བར་འགྱུར།།

135

GSAL BA MED PA SKYE BAR NIKHYOD MI 'DOD KYANG GNAS PA NYIDGAL TE RGYU LA 'BRAS GNAS NA

ZAN ZA MI GTZANG ZA BAR 'GYUR

You do not intent that what is manifest

Lacked earlier existence – yet this is the meaning.

And if results exist within their cause,

Those who eat their food, consume their excrement.

༡༣༦

།རས་ཀྱི་རིན་གྱིས་རས་བལ་གྱི།།

།ས་བོན་ཉོས་ལ་བགོ་བར་གྱིས།།

།འཇིག་རྟེན་རྨོངས་པས་མ་མཐོང་ན།།

།དེ་ཉིད་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་བཞག་དེ་ཉིད།།

136

RAS KYI RIN GYIS RAS BAL GYISA BON NYOS LA BGO BAR GYIS 'JIG RTEN RMONGS PAS MA MTHONG NA

DE NYID SHES KYIS BZHAG DE NYID

And likewise with the money they would spend on clothing,

Let them rather buy the cotton grain to wear.

“But,” you say, “the world is ignorant and blind.”

Since this is taught by those who know the truth,

༡༣༧

།ཤེས་དེ་འཇིག་རྟེན་ལ་ཡང་ནི།།

།ཡོད་པ་

ི་སྟེ་མཐོང་མ་ཡིན།།

།འཇིག་རྟེན་ཚད་མ་ཉིད་མིན་ན།།

།གསལ་བ་མཐོང་བའང་བདེན་མ་ཡིན།།

137

SHES DE 'JIG RTEN LA YANG NIYOD PAS CI STE MTHONG MA YIN'JIG RTEN TSAD MA NYID MIN NA

GSAL BA MTHONG BA'ANG BDEN MA YIN

This knowledge must be present in the worldly.

And if they have it, why do they not see?

You say, “The views of worldly folk are false.”

Therefore, what they clearly see has no validity.

༡༣༨

།གལ་ཏེ་ཚད་མ་ཚད་མིན་ན།།

།དེས་གཞལ་བརྫུན་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རམ།།

།དེ་ཉིད་དུ་ན་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད།།

།སྒོམ་པ་དེ་ཕྱིར་མི་འཐད་འགྱུར།།

138

GAL TE TSAD MA TSAD MIN NADES GZHAL BRDZUN PAR MI 'GYUR RAMDE NYID DU NA STONG PA NYID

SGOM PA DE PHYIR MI 'THAD 'GYUR

“But if there is no truth in their cognition,

All that it assesses is perforce deceptive.

Meditation on the supreme truth of emptiness

Ceases, therefore, to have any meaning.”

So the idea of "reliable." "Tsad ma" is translated as what? Reliable. Validity. Valid cognition, yeah. Valid cognition is mind. Mind sort of labeled tsad ma. So the validated anything, whether it is

[1:51:56]

mind or anything, validated means something will not let you down. The word "tsad ma" in Tibetan, for me, it is not, I don't know whether it is validated or validated cognition, I don't know, really. But reliable. The word "tsad ma" really refers to completely reliable, which cannot be distorted, cannot be changed. That also really validated. That also divided into two: direct, you see, you hear, you confirm, reliable; and indirect, through reasoning, through understanding. And that's what it is, right? [1:53:15 Tib] Gsal ba is following the reasoning or

it's obvious it is that. And how much you can, how quickly you can see the obviousness depends how intelligent the individual really is, how brilliant the individual is. The brilliant people will see it is obvious much more than dull, stupid like me, we know. So that is why we call it "intelligent." So the tsad ma or validation is something absolutely reliable. And when that's called "mind" doesn't perceive this, then that's called unreliable. So that is the division whether it is validated or invalid, false. There's some room in between anyway.

So anyway, if the mind cognition which really accepts whatever it is reliable, and then if not that then it is false. So this argument is this: The meditating on emptiness is false because there is no reliable cognition which proves this. For that:

༡༣༩

།བརྟགས་པའི་དངོས་ལ་མ་རེག་པར།།

།དེ་ཡི་དངོས་མེད་འཛིན་མ་ཡིན།།

།དེ་ཕྱིར་བརྫུན་པའི་དངོས་གང་ཡིན།།

།དེ་ཡི་དངོས་མེད་གསལ་བར་བརྫུན།།

139

BRTAGS PA'I DNGOS LA MA REG PARDE YI DNGOS MED 'DZIN MA YINDE PHYIR BRDZUN PA'I DNGOS GANG YIN

DE YI DNGOS MED GSAL BAR BRDZUN

If there is no object for analysis,

There can be no grasping of its nonexistence.

Therefore, a deceptive object of whatever kind

Will also have an emptiness equally deceptive.

The Madhymikans really accept anything to be known is not truly existing and therefore mind that sees is also not truly existing. In Madhymika, something to be known, who's knowing are both not truly existing. So therefore it's false. And even emptiness is false. The mind that's reading the emptiness is false. So one has to meditate object of negation is false. And knowing that, then you have to be negated. You do not negate something which is truly existing. That's what it is.

༡༤༠

།དེས་ན་རྨི་ལམ་བུ་ཤི་ལ།།

།དེ་མེད་སྙམ་པའི་རྣམ་རྟོག་ནི།།

།དེ་ཡོད་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་ཡི།།

།གེགས་ཡིན་དེ་ཡང་བརྫུན་པ་ཡིན།།

140

DES NA RMI LAM BU SHI LADE MED SNYAM PA'I RNAM RTOG NIDE YOD RNAM PAR RTOG PA YI

GEGS YIN DE YANG BRDZUN PA YIN

Thus, when in a dream, a child has died,

The state of mind that thinks he is no more

Will overwhelm the thought that he was living.

And yet, both thoughts are equally deceptive.

So the direct opponent, which contradicts the negation, is also false and whatever is negating it is also false. And in the Madhyamika system, emptiness is something that knows the false and that meditates and negating something which is true perception. That is negated. Did you get that? Emptiness is knowing false and negating the false perception of existence is negating.

༡༤༡

།དེ་བས་དེ་ལྟར་རྣམ་དཔྱད་པས།།

།འགའ་ཡང་རྒྱུ་མེད་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།།

།སོ་སོ་པ་འམ་འདུས་པ་ཡི།།

།རྐྱེན་རྣམས་ལ་ཡང་གནས་མ་ཡིན།།

141

DE BAS DE LTAR RNAM DPYAD PAS'GA' YANG RGYU MED YOD MA YINSO SO BA'AM 'DUS PA YI

RKYEN RNAMS LA YANG GNAS MA YIN

Therefore, as we see through such investigation,

Nothing is that does not have a cause;

And nothing is existent in its causes

Taken one by one or in the aggregate.

And that is the negation of both.


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